

Du Pareil au Même. De deux identités et de trois doubles

On linguistic sameness: identities and duplications

Guy Achard-Bayle

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to examine two conflicting conceptions of identity: the first, *trivial*, is actually a scholarly term specific to formal logic; the second one, which we will call *naïve*, is revealed to us through ordinary language, including fiction. Utterances often appear fuzzy from a logical point of view – that is to say if we consider their truth value; hence their flexibility and ability to adapt to contexts which do not fulfil truth conditions, *i.e.* they cannot be reduced to a true *vs* false binary opposition, and thus they contradict the principle of *the excluded third*. This claim is striking for the apparently contradictory statements of identity like: *The room was, yet was not mine* (*The lost room*, Fitz James O'Brien). To conclude, we will study among other cases of duplication, the famous but *Strange Case of Dr Jekyll & Mr Hyde* to see precisely how common language used in fiction enables us to grasp and represent this kind of experience about personal identity – knowing that identity is largely made up of identifications.

Key words: identity, identifications, reference, formal Logic, natural Logic, fiction.